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TAKING SCRIPTURE SERIOUSLY: LEIBNIZ AND THE 
JEHOSHAPHAT PROBLEM 
 
I. LEIBNIZ’S COMMITMENT TO CHRISTIANITY 
 
Leibniz’s commitment to Christianity has been questioned for centuries. In his own 
day he was referred to by Hanoverian wags as ‘glaubenichts’ (one who believes in 
nothing) on the grounds that he rarely attended Church or took communion.1 More 
recently, Stuart Brown has claimed that Leibniz ‘shows a tendency to deism’,2 while 
George MacDonald Ross has argued that Leibniz was ‘essentially a pagan 
metaphysician’.3 Both Brown and Ross provide solid grounds for their respective 
assessments; in Brown’s case, that Leibniz’s thought leaves no room for either 
miracles or providence as they have been traditionally conceived by Christians,4 and 
in Ross’ case that Leibniz endorses accounts of creation which bear little relation to – 
and in fact may be inconsistent with – the Biblical account. It seems undeniable that 
on certain issues in which his philosophy led him to a position at odds with orthodox 
Christian thinking, Leibniz had a pronounced tendency to subordinate his theology to 
his philosophy, with the result that he marginalised certain doctrines one would 
typically expect a committed 17th/18th-century Christian to hold. This is true not just 
of creation, miracles and providence, but also of (to take two further examples) 
prophecy and the age of the world. With regard to prophecy, Leibniz favoured 
naturalistic explanations, being loathe to admit the supernatural in any event bar that 
of creation.5 And as for chronology, Leibniz’s geological studies led him to suppose 
that the earth – and hence the world – was considerably older than the 6000-years 
suggested by a literal reading of the Bible.6 
     Yet painting Leibniz as little more than a nominal Christian is not straightforward. 
For one thing, Leibniz expended a great deal of effort to show the reasonableness of 
belief in Christian doctrines such as the Resurrection, the Trinity, the Incarnation, and 
the Eucharist.7 For another, references (and deferences) to scripture abound in 
Leibniz’s writings; they are not just scattered throughout his ecumenical works, where 
one might reasonably expect to find them, but also throughout many of his most well-
known writings such as the Philosopher’s Confession, the Discourse on Metaphysics, 
the Theodicy, as well as his correspondence.8 
     It is, however, possible to explain away both of these features of Leibniz’s work. 
In the first case, a great many of Leibniz’s writings in defence of various Christian 
doctrines were part of his youthful Catholic Demonstrations project, instigated in the 
late 1660s at the request of his (Catholic) employer in Mainz, Johann Christian von 
Boineburg, and resurrected in the 1680s. This project was closely allied to the church 
reunion efforts Leibniz eventually became involved with, and these of course had 
wider political ramifications.9 The motivation behind Leibniz’s defence of core 
Christian doctrines may therefore have been political; Leibniz was, after all, a 
diplomat by profession, and knew what was required to achieve the desirable goal of 
religious harmony. Any suspicion that Leibniz may not have been personally 
committed to the philosophy he developed in his defence of various Christian 
doctrines is reinforced when, in a paper defending the doctrine of the resurrection of 
the same body, he candidly states half-way through that grounds for the doctrine itself 
are lacking, before proceeding to offer a clever philosophical account of how all can 
be resurrected with the same body anyway.10 And in another text written shortly 
afterwards, he asserts that there is no need to insist on humans being resurrected with 
the same body at all.11 As for Leibniz’s use of scripture in his philosophical work, it 
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must be remembered that in an age which frowned on novelty and unorthodoxy, it 
was commonplace for philosophers to show that their ideas harmonized with the 
Bible, or at least were not in conflict with it. A liberal scattering of choice scriptural 
passages in one’s work was the accepted method to show that this was indeed so.12 So 
it is possible to explain away Leibniz’s apparent commitment to Christianity, as 
revealed in his defences of specifically Christian doctrines and by his frequent 
references (and deferences) to scripture in his philosophical work, to leave us with a 
figure resembling Brown’s deist or Ross’ pagan metaphysician. 
 
II. THE JEHOSHAPHAT PROBLEM 
 
Yet there are other Christianized features of Leibniz’s work which are not so easy to 
explain away. One such is his decision to advance a solution to the problem of 
whether (or how) all the humans who had ever lived can simultaneously fit into the 
valley of Jehoshaphat. As will become clear, this is not a problem that would trouble 
either a pagan metaphysician or someone inclined towards deism. 
     Although this problem may strike modern minds as little more than a pleasant 
diversion, akin to a trivia question, it was not considered so in medieval and early 
modern times. The problem itself was bound up with the widely accepted Christian 
belief that the valley of Jehoshaphat was to be the scene of the last judgement, and so 
the place where all the resurrected would, at some future time, be gathered together. 
The sources of this belief are two verses in the Old Testament Book of Joel: 
 
I will gather together all nations, and will bring them down into the valley of 
Jehoshaphat… (Joel 3.2) 
 
Let the nations be roused; let them advance into the Valley of Jehoshaphat, for 
there I will sit to judge all the nations on every side. (Joel 3.12) 
 
Although scripture contains no further references to the valley of Jehoshaphat, on the 
basis of the two passages cited above there developed a tradition which identified this 
valley as the location of the last judgement. Moreover, in the first millennium of the 
common era it became an accepted part of this tradition that the valley in question 
was in fact the one which lies east of Jerusalem, between the city and the Mount of 
Olives, and through which the brook Kidron runs following the rains in the winter 
months (the valley today known variously as the Kidron, Cedron, or Qidron valley).13 
A glance at a map confirms the assessment of one 19th-century writer that this valley 
is ‘comparatively as big as the palm of your hand’;14 although the valley between 
Jerusalem and the Mount of Olives runs for many miles, all the way to the Dead Sea 
around twenty miles away, historically only the portion separating Jerusalem and the 
Mount of Olives has been recognized as the valley of Jehoshaphat. Moreover, this 
small portion, while steep, is very narrow, at less than a mile wide. Its length is 
scarcely any greater. It thus takes no great effort of imagination to spot a degree of 
tension between the relatively small area afforded by this valley and the belief that it 
has been chosen as the site of the last judgement, which involves the gathering 
together of all the humans who have ever lived. The tension created by the size of the 
valley on the one hand, and its identification as the future site of the last judgement on 
the other, gave rise to what I shall henceforth call ‘the Jehoshaphat problem’.15 The 
history of this problem (and the solutions it elicited) has yet to be written; the problem 
goes back at least as far as Aquinas,16 and was still being discussed deep into the 18th-
3 
century,17 and along the way attracted the attention of thinkers as diverse as Jacobus 
de Voragine (c.1229-98),18 Jan Ruysbroeck (1293-1381),19 and Cornelius a Lapide 
(1567-1637).20 
     As should be clear from its origins, the Jehoshaphat problem would only be of 
concern to someone who takes both scripture and Christian tradition seriously, or 
rather, to someone who is committed to their truth. It is therefore noteworthy, given 
the evidence for his being little more than a nominal Christian, that Leibniz seemingly 
was concerned with the Jehoshaphat problem. That Leibniz took the problem 
seriously at all is especially remarkable given that many of his contemporaries 
preferred to dissolve it through hermeneutical means.21 The Lutheran theologian 
Johann Ernst Gerhard (1621-68), for instance, claimed that in the phrase ‘the valley of 
Jehoshaphat’ found in the book of Joel, ‘Jehoshaphat’ served ‘not as a proper 
name...but as an appellative name. For “Jehoshaphat” is the same as “the judgement 
of the Lord”.’22 He was by no means the first to realize this – in a 4th century letter, St. 
Jerome noted that, in Hebrew, ‘Jehoshaphat’ ‘means “the judgement of the Lord”’.23 
While Jerome didn’t draw any firm conclusions about the location of the last 
judgement on the basis of this etymology, Gerhard did. He claimed that since 
‘Jehoshaphat’ means ‘the judgement of the Lord’, then ‘By “the valley of 
Jehoshaphat” he [the author of Joel] means the place the Lord shall choose for 
judgement, wherever it shall be.’24 So in Gerhard’s view, when the author of Joel 
referred to the valley of Jehoshaphat he wasn’t referring to any specific geographical 
location like the valley between Jerusalem and the Mount of Olives, but rather 
somewhere indeterminate. Other writers made precisely the same assertion:25 Edward 
Pococke (1604-1691) claimed on the basis of the etymology of the word 
‘Jehoshaphat’ that the valley of Jehoshaphat mentioned in Joel as the scene of the last 
judgement was ‘any such place, wherever it should be, where God should in such 
manner...execute judgement’.26 John Calvin had come to the same conclusion in the 
16th century, albeit with a measure of hesitancy,27 while in the 17th- and 18th-centuries 
the conclusion was confidently reached by numerous thinkers, including Bénédict 
Pictet (1655-1724)28 and Peter Dens (1690-1755).29 Given Leibniz’s great interest in 
the Hebrew language, etymologies, and scriptural exegesis and hermeneutics, and his 
penchant for employing hermeneutical devices such as accommodation, allegorical 
interpretations and so on,30 one might have expected him to have fallen in with the 
fashionable exegetical manoeuvre endorsed by Gerhard, Pococke et al, and therefore 
not troubled himself with devising a solution to the Jehoshaphat problem. But he did 
not take this route. Yet there is little doubt that Leibniz was aware of the etymology of 
the word ‘Jehoshaphat’, it being noted, for instance, in Cardinal Bellarmine’s De arte 
bene moriendi, which Leibniz cited in several of his own writings.31 Moreover, it is 
also likely that he was aware that this etymology had been used as a basis to deny that 
the last judgement would be held in the valley traditionally identified as the valley of 
Jehoshaphat, as he owned and regularly quoted from an edition of the works of 
Calvin, and was very well read in other works of contemporary theology. It is 
therefore noteworthy that while others of his age sought to resolve the Jehoshaphat 
problem by hermeneutical means, Leibniz opted to take it at face value and show 
precisely how all of the resurrected could simultaneously fit in the valley.  
     Leibniz treated the Jehoshaphat problem on two separate occasions, both late in his 
career, in 1711 and 1715. In sections III and IV I shall examine these two treatments 
in turn, while in section V I shall consider what conclusions should be drawn from 
them with regard to the rival explanations of Leibniz’s theology outlined earlier, 
namely the ‘deist/pagan’ interpretation and the ‘committed Christian’ interpretation. 
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III. LEIBNIZ’S FIRST TREATMENT 
 
Leibniz’s first solution to the Jehoshaphat problem is to be found in a letter to his 
patroness, Electress Sophie of Hanover, from 26 June 1711. Leibniz’s remarks are 
made in response to an undated letter from Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, secretary 
of the French Royal Society and sometime journal editor, to the Marquis de la Fare.32 
(This letter took a very circuitous route to reach Leibniz’s hands: its recipient was 
captain of the guards under Philippe II, the Duke of Orléans, who passed a copy of it 
to his mother, Duchess Elisabeth Charlotte of Orléans, who sent it to her aunt, 
Electress Sophie, who in turn passed it to Leibniz.) In this letter, Fontenelle treated – 
in a very lighthearted manner – the question of whether all the humans who have ever 
lived could simultaneously fit on the entire surface of the Earth, as would have to 
happen at the time of the resurrection.33 The following is Leibniz’s response: 
 
This question has already been discussed by philosophers and by theologians. 
One finds, with the aid of geometry, that all the men taken together over some 
thousands of years...could easily be accommodated on a rather small part of the 
surface of our globe: and a certain author even attempted to determine by this 
calculation how long our world could last at the very most.34 For as all the men 
since Adam up to us must be found room on the day of judgement in the valley 
of Jehoshaphat, human kind will not undergo any further increase in numbers 
once there are enough men to fill this Palestinian valley. So there is no need to 
subtract anything from the flesh and bones of men in order to find room for 
them. And if it were even possible that each person should keep all the matter 
he has possessed since his birth, and that on the day of judgement he should be 
as big as a tower, there would be a way of finding room for all. When people are 
a little too crowded around a table, all they have to do to have more elbow room 
is everywhere move away from it a little, from the centre towards the 
circumference, and so it is here: the good Lord would only have to pull men a 
little into the air to meet with him, and in this way there would be room for 
them, even if there were a lot more of them.35 
 
Leibniz offers two solutions to the Jehoshaphat problem here. The first, which is the 
one he endorses, is that all will be able to fit in the valley. Leibniz’s allusion to a 
geometrical proof of this is unfortunately not accompanied with any indication of 
where it might be found; at any rate such proofs were not uncommon in the early 
modern period, as we shall see in section IV. (His claim that there will be no need to 
subtract anything from the bodies of the resurrected is made in response to a 
suggestion in Fontenelle’s letter that certain portly people, like the recipient of his 
letter, the Marquis de la Fare, will be resurrected in much slimmer bodies than they 
possess in this life.) 
     Leibniz’s second solution, that men will be raised in the air over the valley, applies 
only in the event that humans are resurrected as giants, that is, with bodies containing 
all of the matter which formed part of their bodies at some time during normal life. It 
is unclear why Leibniz should consider this possibility; it is not based on anything in 
Fontenelle’s letter to de la Fare, nor was it in any way a mainstream position at the 
time, or one which could boast of any meaningful support. The only explanations I 
can muster for Leibniz’s taking it into consideration are either that he was responding 
to something contained in a no longer extant letter from either Sophie or Elisabeth 
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Charlotte, or that he was simply being thorough, showing that the Jehoshaphat 
problem admitted of a solution even in the extreme case of humans being resurrected 
as giants. In suggesting that men could be raised in the air over the valley of 
Jehoshaphat, it is tempting to suppose that Leibniz had in mind a passage from 1 
Thessalonians 4.16-17, where it says, with reference to the day of judgement: 
 
For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the 
archangel, and with the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first: Then 
we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, 
to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord. 
 
I think it unlikely, however, that Leibniz had this passage in mind when suggesting 
that men may be pulled into the air over the valley. First, he makes no mention of it, 
yet more often than not he makes it clear when he is quoting or paraphrasing 
scripture. Second, the passage from 1 Thessalonians refers to the blessed and those 
who are still alive at the time of the resurrection being raised into the clouds, whereas 
the most natural reading of Leibniz’s remarks is that all will be so raised.36 
     In framing this solution, I suggest that Leibniz approached the Jehoshaphat 
problem as a simple mathematical puzzle, and solved it by applying a simple 
mathematical principle (if it turns out that more room is required, move away from 
the centre towards the circumference). The solution, while ingenious in many ways, 
does have the drawback of deviating from a literal interpretation of Joel 3.2 and 3.12, 
both of which state that people are brought into the valley of Jehoshaphat (not over, 
above, or in the airspace over). This would seem to suggest a gathering on the valley 
floor, though there were certainly precedents for supposing that at least some of the 
resurrected would be situated in the air over the valley. Peter Lombard (1095-1160), 
for instance, stated that only those to be damned would be in the valley itself, whereas 
‘[t]he just...will not descend into the valley of judgement, that is, into damnation; 
instead they will be raised into the clouds to meet with Christ.’37 Leibniz of course 
goes further, and envisages everyone being in the clouds, or at least in the air, which 
suggests a twofold interpretation of the key passages from Joel: first, literalism as to 
the geographical location of the last judgement, and secondly, non-literalism as to 
whereabouts people will be situated in relation to the valley itself. Underwriting the 
second, non-literal interpretation is of course the belief that the valley is insufficiently 
spacious to accommodate all of the resurrected at once, and as we have seen, this was 
not a belief Leibniz held. 
 
IV. LEIBNIZ’S SECOND TREATMENT 
 
Leibniz’s second treatment of the Jehoshaphat problem, found in a short untitled draft 
note written around 1715,38 can be seen as a development of the first. While he 
remains of the view that the valley of Jehoshaphat is ample enough to contain all, in 
the 1715 note he attempts to demonstrate this belief via mathematical calculation. As 
this note is still unpublished, it is worth quoting here in full: 
 
Let us suppose that on the earth now there are one hundred million souls, and 
that the men are replaced every 50 years. If we grant that the world has existed 
for 6000 years, in accordance with the usual chronology, there will be 120 
renewals. But as the number of men was smaller in the beginning, let us content 
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ourselves with 100 renewals of 100 million men, so all the men together would 
make ten thousand million. 
     Now a German league being 4000 paces and a pace being 5 feet, it will be 
20000 feet, and such a league squared will be 400000000 square feet, that is, 
four hundred million square feet. Let us grant a square foot to each man, for 
although a man can be wider, as a rule he is smaller. So if the valley of 
Jehoshaphat were taken in such a way that it included the whole course of the 
stream which makes the region around Jerusalem fertile, and around a length of 
12½ leagues with a width of 2 leagues, on average, this valley would contain 25 
square leagues, and consequently ten thousand million square feet, without 
counting the fact that there is an enormous number of small children who will 
have no need at all for so much space.39 
 
This unpolished text, clearly one of Leibniz’s numerous ‘memoranda for self’, offers 
a fascinating insight into many areas of Leibniz’s thought, and as such will repay 
careful examination. 
     Although Leibniz here succeeds in showing to his own satisfaction that the valley 
of Jehoshaphat affords sufficient space for all, his estimates and calculations deserve 
some comment. First, in terms of the number to be accommodated, Leibniz’s figure of 
10,000,000,000, is remarkably low even in comparison with the estimates of other 
early modern thinkers who also assumed a six thousand-year chronology.40 Second, 
Leibniz’s relatively low estimate for the number of humans to be accommodated 
inevitably leads to a relatively low estimate of the amount of space required for them, 
though because of the uncertainty about the size of the units of old measurements, 
especially of old German measurements which varied from state to state, it is not easy 
to determine just how large Leibniz took this space to be. To illustrate, scholars have 
variously defined the old German league or mile as being 4.4 present miles,41 
approximately 4.6 present miles,42 and 5 present miles43 (there are also various other 
estimates which fall outside of this range), so quite possibly Leibniz’s position is that 
10,000,000,000 humans will require an area of between approximately 110 and 125 
present square miles. By a happy calculation, Leibniz determines that the space 
available in the valley of Jehoshaphat is sufficient to accommodate all, though such a 
neat result is bought at the price of grossly overestimating the size of the valley of 
Jehoshaphat. It seems Leibniz was aware of this, given his remark that ‘if the valley 
of Jehoshaphat were taken in such a way that it included...’, which is an 
acknowledgement that for the purposes of the issue at hand he is construing the valley 
of Jehoshaphat to include some of the area beyond it – in fact, given his 
measurements, he is probably construing it as including the remainder of the valley 
through which the Kidron brook runs, all the way to the Dead Sea. One can only 
assume that Leibniz did not have an accurate map at his disposal, because even if it is 
legitimate to construe the valley of Jehoshaphat as extending all the way to the Dead 
Sea, his calculation that the valley has an area of twenty five square leagues 
(approximately 110-125 present square miles) is generous to the point of being a 
gross exaggeration. In spite of its shortcomings, Leibniz’s response to the Jehoshaphat 
problem is nothing less than an attempt to demonstrate mathematically that the valley 
of Jehoshaphat is large enough to accommodate all. As such, it is part of a pattern of 
early modern responses to the Jehoshaphat problem which attempt to resolve the 
problem via simple mathematical calculation. For example, Marin Mersenne (1588-
1648), always keen to show the practical value of mathematics, calculated that all the 
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humans who had ever lived could be accommodated together in and around the valley 
of Jehoshaphat: 
 
the globe of the earth and the water are large enough to carry 
148,456,800,000,000 men, provided that each occupies only a square foot. Now 
according to these hypotheses, all the blessed and all the reprobate could be 
contained in the 40th part of terra firma, if we give a square foot to each; 
consequently the valley of Jehoshaphat, with the neighbouring places up to 8 
degrees all around, could contain all those who will be present on the day of the 
last judgement.44 
 
The Jesuit François-Xavier de Feller (1735-1802) came to a very similar conclusion 
via a similarly speculative mathematical route. He calculated that the number of 
people who had ever lived was 200,000,000,000, each of whom will require one 
square foot of space apiece at the time of the last judgement. Although this is 
considerably more space than the area afforded by the valley of Jehoshaphat, Feller 
refuses to consider this a problem, on the grounds that ‘It has never been thought that 
the valley of Jehoshaphat had to contain all the men who returned at the universal 
judgement, but rather that this valley would form the centre of this vast assembly.’45 
Feller thus states explicitly what Mersenne only implied, namely that at the last 
judgement it is sufficient for people to gather in and around the valley of Jehoshaphat. 
Leibniz’s suggestion in his 1715 text on the Jehoshaphat problem is cut from the same 
cloth: like Mersenne and Feller, Leibniz finds that the figures do not permit the 
accommodation of all within the area traditionally identified as the valley of 
Jehoshaphat, and consequently he treats some of the area around the valley as the 
overspill which will accommodate those who cannot fit into the valley itself. The 
chief difference between Leibniz’s solution and that offered by Mersenne and Feller is 
that the latter pair treat the valley of Jehoshaphat as the centre point of this vast 
assembly, while Leibniz does not, preferring instead to have the surplus gather in the 
parts of the valley not traditionally considered to be the valley of Jehoshaphat. 
     From the fact that Leibniz returned to the Jehoshaphat problem and sought to 
provide a mathematical basis for his earlier claim that the valley was spacious enough 
for all, we can infer that he took the Jehoshaphat problem very seriously, more 
seriously than one might perhaps have expected given his portrayal as a pagan 
metaphysician, or someone with leanings towards deism. 
 
V. LEIBNIZ’S TREATMENTS IN CONTEXT 
 
It is therefore tempting to conclude that Leibniz’s decision to apply himself to the 
Jehoshaphat problem shows that he was in fact a committed Christian, personally 
concerned with problems arising out of scripture and Christian tradition. After all, the 
circumstances surrounding the composition of his treatments of the Jehoshaphat 
problem do not themselves offer any basis for doubting the sincerity of those 
treatments. In the case of the letter to Electress Sophie, Leibniz was responding to a 
problem raised by Fontenelle, that of whether the Earth will have sufficient room for 
all after the resurrection. Fontenelle made no mention of the valley of Jehoshaphat, 
nor is there any evidence that Leibniz was pressed to refer to it and/or the associated 
Jehoshaphat problem at someone else’s behest. Consequently, Leibniz’s decision to 
respond to Fontenelle’s letter by focusing on the Jehoshaphat problem was his own. 
As such, we may say that Leibniz was internally motivated to introduce and discuss 
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the Jehoshaphat problem, rather than externally motivated. As for the 1715 text on the 
Jehoshaphat problem, this too seems to have been internally motivated; at any rate 
Leibniz certainly does not mention any external factors which led him to compose it: 
he simply sets out to solve the Jehoshaphat problem. The date of composition 
supports this reading: in 1715 Leibniz was no longer involved in any ecumenical 
projects and therefore was not writing texts in support of such ventures. The Catholic 
Demonstrations project, along with his other irenical efforts, were at that time long 
since abandoned. By all accounts, the 1715 text is as it appears to be – a short 
memorandum for self, motivated purely by personal interest or concern.46 
     Yet with Leibniz very little is ever straightforward, and there are elements of the 
second of his two treatments of the Jehoshaphat problem which make it difficult to 
state unequivocally that it ought to be interpreted as solid evidence of a personal 
commitment to Christianity. The two I shall focus on are chronology and the 
resurrection. 
     In the 1715 text, Leibniz considers the Earth to be 6000 years old, which would 
date creation to around 4000BC or thereabouts. That Leibniz would accept such a 
chronology would perhaps be unsurprising but for the fact that, from 1687 onwards, 
he identifies a need to endorse a chronology based on the Septuagint, which dates 
creation at around 5200BC.47 Like other thinkers of his time, his reason for inclining 
towards the Septuagint was that it enabled the Biblical account of history to be 
reconciled with Chinese history, which by all accounts required more time than a 
Vulgate-based chronology was able to offer.48 Yet the 1715 text on the Jehoshaphat 
problem suggests that Leibniz ultimately abandoned his previously-stated inclination 
for the Septuagint chronology in favour of one based on the Vulgate, as in it he 
assumes the latter rather than the former. If this assumption does indicate a genuine 
change of heart over which chronology to favour, then how is it to be explained? One 
possibility is expediency – a Vulgate-based chronology would permit a lower estimate 
of the number of people who have ever lived, which in turn would make the 
Jehoshaphat problem easier to solve. Another possibility is that Leibniz was not 
sincere when he expressed a preference for the Septuagint-based chronology; after all, 
this preference is to be found only in letters to people who Leibniz knew were also 
concerned with harmonizing Biblical and Chinese history, and as such his stated 
preference for the Septuagint may have been due to his desire to appear ‘orthodox’ on 
this issue (that is, to be seen as following the dominant trend of the time). I can see no 
way of adjudicating between these possibilities. It is quite likely, however, that 
neither of them is correct. I mentioned in section I that Leibniz’s geological studies 
led him to suppose that the earth is much older than is suggested by a literal reading 
of the Bible, and that remains true whether the Bible is understood as the Vulgate or 
the Septuagint. Leibniz apparently never abandoned his views on the formation of the 
earth and its early (pre-human) history, repeating them in texts as late as 1710 and 
1714,49 which suggests that he never abandoned his belief that the earth is older than a 
literal reading of the Bible would intimate. If so, then ultimately Leibniz accepted 
neither a Vulgate- or Septuagint-based chronology. 
     It might be thought possible to square Leibniz’s geological commitments with his 
apparent acceptance of one or other of the biblical chronologies by drawing a careful 
distinction between the age of the earth on one hand, and the age of humanity on the 
other. So it might be argued that while Leibniz believed that the earth itself had 
existed for much more than six millennia, he also held that human history only dated 
back around 6000 years (and presumably was as indicated in one interpretation of 
scripture or another). If Leibniz did indeed draw this distinction, then it was done so 
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only in his own mind: there are no texts in which he addresses this matter explicitly. 
However there is at least one text in which Leibniz clearly leaves no room for the 
aforementioned distinction, namely the 1715 text on the Jehoshaphat problem. In this 
text, as we have seen, he writes ‘If we grant that the world has existed for 6000 
years...’. Here Leibniz is giving a date for the creation of the world, and he goes on to 
assume that it also marks the beginning of human history. 
     This generates something of a headache for Leibniz scholars, as Leibniz appears to 
accept three mutually incompatible chronologies, one based on his geological studies, 
one based on the Septuagint, and, in the 1715 text on the Jehoshaphat problem, one 
based on the Vulgate. Which of these got his earnest support is difficult to determine, 
though I suspect he favoured the first of the three simply because it is a corollary of 
his own research. If that is correct, then Leibniz accepted neither the Vulgate- or 
Septuagint-based chronologies, which in turn casts doubt as to the sincerity of his 
second treatment of the Jehoshaphat problem. 
     The 1715 text throws up another puzzle for Leibniz scholars, in the form of the 
rare insight it throws into Leibniz’s eschatology. Leibniz often stated that scripture 
had not provided much detail about what happens after this life,50 and he was critical 
of others who confidently provided such details (e.g. Francis Mercury van 
Helmont).51 Yet in the 1715 text, Leibniz seems to adopt a very specific (and very 
unusual) position regarding the resurrection of those who die as children. Consider his 
remark at the end of the text, that ‘small children...will have no need at all for so 
much space’. The most obvious interpretation has Leibniz saying that small children 
will have no need for a square foot of space apiece in the valley of Jehoshaphat, 
which strongly suggests that Leibniz held that those who die as children will be 
resurrected as children, or at least with child-sized bodies. One might reasonably 
suppose that if Leibniz did endorse this view he would have mentioned it in other 
writings. But he didn’t. Nor was it a view that was so in tune with orthodoxy that 
one’s adherence to it required neither statement nor justification. Far from it in fact: 
such a view was out of step with traditional Christian thinking of the time, which held 
that everyone will be resurrected as mature adults, even those who died as children. 
Augustine, for instance, claimed that children ‘will not have, in the resurrection, the 
tiny bodies in which they died’, but rather ‘by God’s wonderful and immediate action’ 
they will be resurrected with bodies ‘the size they would have reached in time by the 
slow process of growth’.52 Aquinas, meanwhile, held that ‘all must rise in the age of 
Christ’, which implies that all will be resurrected with bodies of 30-year old adults.53 
Scriptural grounds were often cited in support of this view, for instance Ephesians 
4.13: ‘until we all ... become mature, attaining to the whole measure of the fullness of 
Christ’. Leibniz was well aware both that this view had the support of thinkers such as 
Augustine and that there was an apparent scriptural basis for it, mentioning both in a 
short paper on the resurrection.54 Another reason for following the position outlined 
by Augustine and Aquinas was the apparent difficulty with the alternative, for if those 
who died as children are resurrected as children, then consistency would seem to 
require that those who died as foetuses are resurrected as foetuses. Such a thought was 
often considered to serve as a reductio of the claim that humans are resurrected with 
numerically the same bodies they had at the point of death, for instance by John 
Locke.55 In apparently rejecting this view, Leibniz may well have bought himself 
extra space in the valley of Jehoshaphat, but at the cost of adopting a position at sharp 
odds with traditional Christian thinking, as he knew, and which was associated with 





Ultimately, then, Leibniz’s treatments of the Jehoshaphat problem can be construed as 
evidence both for and against the ‘deist/pagan’ interpretation and the ‘committed 
Christian’ interpretation. On the one hand, the fact that Leibniz wished to solve the 
problem at all, for his own reasons, suggests a strong commitment to Christianity, 
since no deist or pagan would feel the need to take the problem seriously. On the 
other hand, certain elements of Leibniz’s second solution, from 1715, are such as to 
raise doubts about whether he was sincere in advancing it. His apparent allegiance to 
a Vulgate-based chronology in the 1715 text is flatly contradicted by an avowed 
leaning towards a Septuagint-based chronology elsewhere, and both are undercut by 
the results of Leibniz’s geological work. Moreover, his insinuation in the same text 
that those who die as children will be resurrected as children is a thought not to be 
found elsewhere in his corpus; yet the fact that it is at odds with traditional Christian 
thinking and problematic in its own right (as he well knew), means that one would 
expect Leibniz to have tried to justify it (to himself at least) if indeed it was a view he 
sincerely held. 
     Leibniz was undoubtedly a complicated man, and his true religious beliefs and 
commitments are hard to tease out from the enormous range of writings he left 
behind, some of which can support radically disparate interpretations, as we have 
seen. Richard Popkin once asked: ‘Do we have to have two, or maybe three, or four 
Leibnizes to make him compatible...?’57 Although one should not multiply Leibnizes 
without necessity, it is clear that the complexity of the man’s beliefs (and perhaps the 
tension between them, if ultimately there be such) will require much greater efforts 
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